
The fall-out from Qantas
The industrial relations world is still coming to terms with the sheer scale of the Federal Court’s decision.
The Parliament has today passed the Secure Jobs and Better Pay Bill 2022. The Bill is set to become an operative law in a matter of days, although some aspects have deferred start dates (as indicated below).
Since our previous alert, a number of changes have been made to the proposed laws, including:
Whilst the scope of the new laws is broad, this represents just the first tranche of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) IR Reform agenda. Still to come next year remains policy regulation for (amongst other things):
Through its representation of the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, ABLA has been at the forefront of these changes, giving feedback to Government, employer groups and unions over the past few months and participating in numerous consultations arising from the Jobs Summit.
With this leading level of insight, we are pleased to update clients on the specific details of the changes and the impact these changes are likely to have on businesses.
In this article we will focus exclusively on the significant changes to the enterprise bargaining framework. Two subsequent articles will focus on:
While the Bill is likely to receive royal assent in the coming day or days, the operation of the new laws have staggered commencement dates, to allow for some transition process.
The key commencement dates are as follows:
Immediate effect
Three Months after royal assent (March 2023)
Six months after royal assent (June 2023)
On a date to be proclaimed by the Minister or six months after royal assent at latest (June 2023)
12 months after royal assent (December 2023)
We address each of the enterprise bargaining reforms below, which cut across both single enterprise agreements and multi-enterprise agreements.
Perhaps the biggest impact of the IR reforms is its shake-up of multi-employer bargaining. Multi-employer bargaining is being expanded across three streams:
Each stream expands the ability for employees/unions to unilaterally compel their employer to join into bargaining with other employers or alternatively to become covered by existing multi-employer agreements.
However, the single-interest employer authorization and supported bargaining streams do not apply to the building and construction industry.
Under this stream, employers or employee bargaining representatives can seek an authorisation from the FWC requiring the employer to bargain in conjunction with other employers if:
Where an employer does not consent to be added to the stream, the employers will only be exempted from these types of applications if they fall into one of the following categories:
There is, however, a ‘grace period’ during which employers can ask the FWC to exercise its discretion to not make a single interest authorisation. This grace period operates for a limited period of nine months after a previous enterprise agreement covering the relevant employees has passed its nominal expiry date, provided that:
In relation to whether employers have “clearly identifiable common interests”, the FWC is required to consider:
There are also strict rules regarding how these types of agreements can be put to vote. An employer can only put an agreement to vote if either:
Naturally, these new provisions are going to make voting on proposed multi-employer agreements complex and difficult where unions do not agree with the content of the agreement being put forward for voting.
Employees can take industrial action in support of these multi-employer agreements in the single-interest employer stream.
Employers are not permitted to make single enterprise agreements once covered by a single-interest authorisation.
Once an employer is caught by a single-interest employer authorisation, the employer is compelled to comply with good faith bargaining obligations, which include (amongst other things) attending meetings at reasonable times, considering and responding to bargaining proposals in a timely manner and disclosing relevant information in a timely manner.
Moreover, where a single-interest employer agreement exists, either an employer or an employee bargaining representative can apply to the FWC to add a new employer to the EA, provided that:
Where a new employer does not consent to the variation application to extend the application of a single- interest employer agreement, the variation will not be available where:
Again, a grace period applies during which employers can ask the FWC to exercise its discretion to not extend an existing multi-employer agreement to its business. This grace period operates for a limited period of nine months after a previous enterprise agreement covering the relevant employees has passed its nominal expiry date, provided that:
This represents a seismic shift in the existing regime. Presently, multi-employer bargaining can only be conducted where the employers wish to bargain together. The amendments invert this process and permit employees to dictate to employers that they must bargain together.
The requirement that there be “clearly identifiable common interests” between employers before they can be compelled to bargain together appears rather broad. The reforms talk about taking into account geographical areas and the nature of the business engaged in by employers with respect to whether the employers have a common interest. However, no mention is made about whether the employers are competing with each other and accordingly should not be collectively bargaining on employment terms. The early application of this “common interest” test by the FWC will be critical to determining how widely multi-employer bargaining is adopted.
The supported bargaining stream is a special stream of bargaining that renames and expands upon the “low paid bargaining authorisations” presently contained in the FW Act.
The stream is focused on enabling employees to apply to the FWC for an authorisation compelling their employer to bargain in conjunction with other employers if:
In relation to whether employers have “clearly identifiable common interests”, the FWC is required to consider:
The authorisations will not be able to cover any employees covered by an existing single-enterprise agreement that has not passed its nominal expiry date - unless the employer entered into the EA with the main intention of avoiding being specified in the supported employer authorisation.
Unlike the single-interest authorisation stream, no ‘grace period’ exists in supported bargaining to enable the FWC to refuse to make a support bargaining authorisation where an existing enterprise agreement has recently passed its nominal expiry date.
Once an employer is subject to a supported bargaining authorisation, the employer is compelled to comply with good faith bargaining obligations, which include (amongst other things) attending meetings at reasonable times, considering and responding to bargaining proposals in a timely manner and disclosing relevant information in a timely manner.
Moreover, any supported bargaining EA automatically prevails over any other EA applicable to an employer, even if the other EA was bargained and approved first. That is, supported bargaining EAs prevail over all other EAs applicable to the employer with respect to the same employees.
Employees can take industrial action in support of these multi-employer agreements in the supported employer authorisation stream. This was not previously available for multi-employer agreements.
Where agreement is unable to be reached on terms to go into a supported bargaining stream EA, the existing provisions of s260 and s269-s279 of the FW Act (which presently apply to “low paid bargaining authorisations”) enable a bargaining representative to apply to the FWC to make a supported bargaining workplace determination, which would compel an arbitrated outcome on the parties regarding outstanding matters in dispute.
Co-operative workplace agreements are to be defined as all multi-employer enterprise agreements that were not made through a supported bargaining authorisation process.
The co-operative workplaces stream enables employees and employers to jointly seek to have their enterprise joined to another co-operative workplace agreement (that is, a multi-enterprise agreement that is not made through a supported bargaining authorisation process) through an application process with the FWC.
The process to apply for an existing cooperative workplace agreement to be varied and extend its coverage to a new employer must be made jointly by the employers and employees. This is done by the employer requesting the employees to be covered by the cooperative workplace agreement through a voting process, and a majority of those employees who cast a valid vote must vote in favour of the cooperative workplace agreement being varied.
Once the application is made, the FWC must approve the variation to the cooperative workplace agreement if:
These changes appear to have two primary impacts:
These changes might be attractive to smaller businesses that wish to implement an EA in their business and have identified an industry-level EA that they consider would readily be able to be adopted by their business.
The existing prescriptive requirements that must be met in order to have an EA to be approved have been extinguished. For instance, requirements about ‘access periods’, what documents need to be given to employees, what information needs to be explained and circulation of voting process information are to be removed from the FW Act. In their place, three broad requirements primarily emerge.
The FWC will have a very broad discretion to determine whether an EA has been “genuinely agreed”.
In order to explain how this discretion will be exercised, the FWC will be required to issue a Statement of Principles that will outline the types of measures that would ordinarily be expected in order to secure genuine agreement. The Statement of Principles will address the following matters:
The intention is to simplify detailed and complex pre-approval requirements in order to encourage enterprise bargaining and ensure the FWC is not required to refuse to approve agreements due to minor or technical procedural deficiencies that did not affect how employees voted on the agreement.
It remains to be seen whether such a detailed statement will indeed simplify the approval process or will simply lead to new and different prescriptive requirements for the approval of EAs.
These new EA notification requirements will only apply to EAs where bargaining has started after the commencement of the IR Reforms.
The obligation to provide a Notice of Employee Representational Rights (NERR) and to wait until at least 21 days after the last notice is given before requesting employees to vote will no longer apply to bargaining for a proposed single-interest employer agreement, supported bargaining agreement or cooperative workplaces agreement.
The requirement to issue the NERR will remain, as it presently operates under the FW Act, in the case of a proposed single enterprise agreement.
As is presently the case, minor technical or procedural errors in relation to the issuing of the NERR that do not disadvantage employees will not prevent an EA from being approved.
In order to approve an EA, the FWC must also be satisfied that the employees who requested to vote on the EA:
The BOOT will be revised so that the FWC is required to approve an agreement as being better off overall provided that employees are better off overall “globally”, as opposed by comparing each entitlement in an EA against the underlying award.
Moreover, when assessing whether employees are better off overall, the FWC will:
However, in return for these improvements, employers will pay a significant price. The BOOT amendments also contain a provision empowering employees or unions to trigger a reconsideration of the BOOT at any time after the EA is approved, provided:
The reconsideration itself is quite complicated:
If the FWC is satisfied on any reconsideration that the circumstances of any employee does not meet the BOOT (on reconsideration) then either:
Any undertaking or variation will apply to all employees from seven days after the date of the variation moving forward (unless a different date is specified by the FWC).
The consequence of this is effectively that EA’s will no longer ‘lock in’ terms and conditions of employment for the life of the EA. Instead, EA terms can be capable of continuous challenge or scrutiny, if there is any prospect of employees being worse off under the EA when compared to the award.
In many ways the changes to the BOOT are likely to create more uncertainty and confusion than presently exist. If the changes were designed to incentivise bargaining (as claimed), they have sadly not achieved their goal.
Another significant change relates to when employers can be compelled to bargain in circumstances where the parties have previously bargained for a single enterprise agreement.
If an employer has been covered by an EA that expired within the previous five years (the earlier agreement), then any bargaining representative of employees covered by that EA can request that the employer commence bargaining for a new replacement agreement, provided that:
This change would not be available to initiate bargaining for a proposed greenfields agreement, a multi- enterprise agreement (ie a cooperative workplaces agreement or a supported bargaining agreement) or a single enterprise agreement in relation to which a single-interest employer authorisation is in operation.
Once the request has been made, two important consequences flow:
Under the present FW Act, parties cannot ordinarily apply to the FWC to seek a binding decision on what terms should or should not be included in an EA.
The determination of what terms are included in an agreement is for the parties to agree to or for the employer to ultimately determine and put to a vote.
This will all change under the IR reforms.
Where there is “no reasonable prospect of agreement being reached”, then a bargaining representative is able to apply to the FWC for an “intractable bargaining declaration”. However, before making an application, a bargaining representative is still required to participate in the existing bargaining dispute processes under the FW Act (s240 disputes).
Once an intractable bargaining declaration is made, the FWC must either:
Parties that are subject to an intractable bargaining declaration will be unable to take protected industrial action.
This, for the first time under the FW Act, introduces ‘unilateral arbitration’ into enterprise bargaining, that is, a scenario where one party can effectively disagree to the claims made in bargaining and seek to have terms imposed on all parties by way of arbitration.
This form of arbitration is available in both single enterprise agreements and all multi-employer bargaining streams.
However, in a late change to the laws, intractable bargaining declarations will only be available either:
The Bill requires the FWC to convene a conciliation conference between bargaining representatives every time a protected action ballot order (PABO) is filed. Whilst this does not prevent protected industrial action being taken, it involves a third party in a dispute resolution process in response to each and every time employees seek to commence the process of taking industrial action.
The conciliation process must be held between when the PABO is applied for and when the date for the PABO voting closes - ensuring that the conciliation has been held before any industrial action is taken.
The process for conducting PABOs will also be significantly overhauled. Presently, PABOs are conducted mainly by the Australian Electoral Commission, unless the FWC determines an alternative person (who is assessed as a ‘fit and proper person’) should conduct the PABO.
The reforms seek to establish a list of ‘fit and proper persons’ who may conduct PABOs. This enables bargaining representatives to more easily seek alternative persons to conduct their PABOs, provided the alternatives nominated are identified on the fit and proper person list.
Over the past eight years, employers have increasingly sought to use the ability to terminate EAs, after passing their nominal expiry date (and without employee agreement), as leverage in protracted bargaining disputes with unions.
The practice expanded following the decision in Aurizon Network Pty Ltd [2015] FWCFB 540, where the FWC confirmed a broad capability to terminate EAs, unless the terminations were contrary to the public interest.
The threat of terminations can carry real consequences for employees. EAs tend to have higher rates of pay than the underlying award and usually confer other protections or benefits that don’t form part of the award-safety net. Technically speaking, a workforce’s terms and conditions can revert to a significantly inferior position after an EA has been terminated unless undertakings are given to maintain key conditions.
The ability to terminate EAs will be substantially curtailed.
Under the Bill, EAs will only be able to be terminated without employee agreement where they have passed their nominal expiry date and fall into one of the following three categories:
These provisions will apply to all new and existing termination applications, provided that in relation to existing termination applications the FWC has not yet terminated (or refused to terminate) a particular EA.
Download a copy of the Enterprise Bargaining publication via the image at the top of this page.
Please get in touch with our Workplace and Employment Team at info@ablawyers.com.au to discuss the impact of these reforms on your business.
Stay Informed
Subscribe to our mailing list to get the latest news, webinar invites, & more.
All fields are required